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Abstract
The Delhi High Court has rejected the petition filed by Bayer 
Corporation seeking to stop the Drugs Controller of India (DCGI) 
from registering a generic version of a patented cancer drug. 
The case was filed in 2008 by Bayer to try and introduce “patent 
linkage”, which involves linking the registration (marketing 
approval) of drugs with their patent status. If Bayer’s plea for 
“patent linkage” had been accepted by the court, it would have 
undermined public health safeguards contained in India’s patent 
legislation. This comment discusses the Bayer case in the context of 
efforts by multinational pharmaceutical companies to introduce 
barriers to generic competition, the only proven means of reducing 
the prices of medicines to make them affordable to those in need. 
Bayer has filed an appeal in the Supreme Court, indicating that it 
does not intend to give up.
india is home to a large pharmaceutical generic industry 
that in addition to meeting domestic needs also supplies the 
developing world. However, its domestic production of essential 
medicines is constantly under threat - both from intellectual 
property norms adopted in trade agreements and from patent 
disputes that are being brought against the government of 
india by multinational pharmaceutical companies. 
in a positive development, the Division Bench of the Delhi High 
Court stopped the german pharmaceutical company Bayer 
Corporation’s latest attempt to introduce new “patent policing 
measures” to prevent generic competition in india. By ruling 
against Bayer on February 9, 2010, the Delhi High Court refused 
to undermine legal safeguards in india’s patent law that help 
ensure access to more affordable essential medicines for 
patients in india and other developing countries. However, the 
battle is by no means over. Bayer has filed an appeal against the 
decision in the Supreme Court (1). 
Background
generic competition is the only proven means of reducing 
the prices of medicines to more affordable levels. AiDS and 
cancer treatment are an important illustration of the benefits 
of encouraging generic production. Currently the majority of 
people living with HiV on treatment in low- and middle-income 
countries use generic antiretroviral drugs manufactured mostly 
from india (2). it was only with the arrival of generic anti-
retrovirals produced by indian companies on the market in 
2001 that prices started to reduce significantly - from $10,439 
to $350 per patient per year for first-line AiDS treatment. 
The first fixed dose combination of stavudine/ lamivudine/ 
nevirapine was developed by Cipla and went on to become 
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instrumental in rolling out antiretroviral therapy in Africa, 
Latin America and Asia and other developing countries 
including india. Today, it is available for as little as US$80 
per patient per year - 1/130th of the price demanded by 
multinational pharmaceutical companies in 2001. With 
continued generic production, the price of improved first-
line AiDS treatment (the three-in-one fixed-dose combination 
of tenofovir/ lamivudine/ efavirenz) has also dropped 
considerably over the last two years (43% reduction) to US$ 
243 per patient per year (3). 
Similarly, the generic production, by indian drug manufacturers, 
of imatinib, a crucial cancer drug essential in prolonging the life 
of patients suffering from chronic myeloid leukaemia (CML) 
played a crucial role in significantly increasing the access of 
cancer patients to this drug. The drug is considered to be the 
first line of treatment for CML, fights cancer cells without being 
toxic to healthy cells, and has to be taken lifelong. in addition, 
it is now being tested for treating other forms of cancer. The 
generic version of imatinib is priced at less than one tenth of 
the price of the originator at approximately Rs 8,000 per patient 
per month, compared to novartis’ price of approximately Rs 
1,20,000 per patient per month. 
That is because, until recently, india did not grant patents on 
medicines (4), which allowed indian generic manufacturers 
to compete with multinational pharmaceutical companies 
and with each other to produce lower-priced generic versions 
of drugs patented in other countries. This sort of generic 
competition among multiple producers is what made the cost 
of AiDS medicines fall dramatically and helped facilitate the 
scale-up of antiretroviral therapy to millions living with HiV in 
the developing world. 
Patents	in	India	threaten	a	key	source	of	affordable	
medicines
However, india is drying up as a source of affordable versions 
of newer and future medicines. This is due to amendments 
made to india’s patent law in 2005 (5), when the country was 
required to begin reviewing pharmaceutical product patents 
according to its international obligations under the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade Related aspects 
of intellectual Property Rights (TRiPS). 
Patenting of medicines in india could mean that indian 
manufacturers will no longer be able to produce cheaper 
versions of newer medicines. Precisely such newer drugs are 
crucial, for example, for the treatment of HiV/AiDS, hepatitis C, 
cancer and other diseases. 
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Fortunately, when the indian Parliament amended its patent 
law in 2005, an effort was made to find a balance between the 
intellectual property rights of pharmaceutical companies and 
the need to protect public health, ensure supply to national 
treatment programmes and make drugs as affordable as 
possible. 
While section 3(d) of the amended indian Patent Act, 2005, was 
inserted to safeguard against the granting of frivolous patents 
on trivial improvements of known molecules, there was also a 
great concern about those new drugs (new chemical entities) 
invented after 1995 that would be patented under indian 
law. To this end, key safeguards in india’s amended patent 
law such as the “early working exception” (section 107 A) and 
the provisions on compulsory licensing (sections 84, 92, 92A 
and 100) were also included in the law to ensure generic 
production in the event that patent holders failed to fulfill their 
duty to make patented medicines available and affordable to 
patients.
now both the early working exception and compulsory 
licensing provisions that create mechanisms for generic 
competition are at considerable risk because of a pending 
court case filed by Bayer against the Union of india and the 
Drugs Controller general of india (DCgi). 
The	Bayer	case	against	the	Union	of	India
After the 2005 amendment of the indian patent law, 
multinational pharmaceutical companies have been pushing 
india’s drug regulator, the DCgi, to implement patent linkage in 
india. 
Establishing a link between patent status on the one hand 
and the registration (also known as marketing approval) of 
a medicine on the other hand means that a national drug 
regulatory authority is required to withhold marketing 
approval to a generic version of a patented drug, regardless of 
whether the patent granted is valid or not. 
A petition was filed by Bayer in 2008, seeking to stop the 
DCgi from granting marketing approval to a generic version 
of a patented cancer drug. The case was filed before the Delhi 
High Court on the grounds that the DCgi had entertained 
the application for granting marketing approval to a generic 
version of the anti-cancer drug sorafenib tosylate, for which 
Bayer has obtained a patent (in215758) in india. (Sorafenib is a 
drug approved for the treatment of renal and liver cancer.) 
By filing this case against the indian government, Bayer seeks to 
ensure that indian drug regulatory authorities do not register a 
cheaper generic version of a drug, if it is patented. 
All medicines to be sold in the indian market require prior 
marketing approval from the DCgi. if Bayer’s demands in its 
case against the government of india are accepted, it will 
block the marketing approval of generic versions of patented 
medicines - even if the patent is wrongly granted or the 
approval is with the objective of applying for a compulsory 
license or entering the market once the patent has expired. 
But a drug regulatory authority’s role is to ensure that 
medicines marketed in a country are proved to be of quality, 
safe and effective: it delivers a necessary green light before a 
drug can be manufactured or marketed. its role is not to deal 
with the patent status of the medicines, which is the role of a 
country’s patent office. 
Chronology	of	the	Bayer	case
The petition was first heard by a single judge bench of the 
Delhi High Court in 2009 and was dismissed as “vexatious 
and luxury litigation”. Justice Ravindra Bhat rejected Bayer’s 
petition seeking to prevent the DCgi from registering Cipla’s 
version of sorafenib and made it clear that “Bayer’s argument of 
inferring drug agencies’ role in patent policing or enforcement 
is unacceptable.”(6) 
Bayer filed an appeal against the decision before the Division 
Bench of the Delhi High Court. 
in a welcome move for access to medicines, this decision was 
upheld by the Division Bench in February 2010. in the words of 
the judges of the Division Bench, 
 This Court concurs with the learned Single Judge that the 
scheme of both the Patents Act and the Drugs & Cosmetic 
Act are distinct and separate and that the attempt by 
the appellant Bayer to establish a linkage cannot be 
countenanced. if Bayer’s argument were to be accepted, it 
would mean that instead of the validity of the patent being 
tested, if at all, either in revocation proceedings or by way of 
a counter-claim in infringement proceedings instituted by 
the patent holder, the DCgi will begin with the presumption 
that the patent granted in respect of the drug for which 
marketing approval is sought has been validly granted. (7)
But Bayer has now dragged the indian drug regulator and the 
indian government to the Supreme Court. it has filed a special 
leave petition against the decision of the Delhi High Court 
in the Supreme Court which was admitted for hearing on 
February 26, 2010. 
Implications	of	the	Delhi	High	Court	decision	
The Court’s decision was very important because it stopped 
Bayer’s attempt to introduce a new barrier to generic 
competition and ensured that different public health 
safeguards in india’s patents law remain useable. 
One safeguard in the patent law, known as the “Bolar” or “early 
working exception”, allows a generic producer to manufacture 
a drug even when it is under patent and obtain marketing 
authorisation in advance, so that a generic can be put on the 
market as soon as the patent is invalidated or revoked, or 
expires. india’s patent law allows manufacturers to do this 
without fear of facing an infringement suit.
A second safeguard is compulsory licensing. Compulsory 
licenses can be issued to generic producers if patented essential 
medicines are not available or affordable in india, or if other 
countries which lack production capacity order essential drugs 
indian Journal of Medical Ethics Vol Vii no 2 April - June 2010
[ 98 ]
from india. But if Bayer had succeeded in introducing patent 
linkage in india, this could have blocked the marketing approval 
of generic medicines made under the terms of a compulsory 
license, thereby rendering the compulsory license useless. 
These public health safeguards will become increasingly 
important as the effect of the newly introduced pharmaceutical 
product patent regime is felt in the country. The TRiPS 
Agreement made it mandatory for india to have a patent 
regime for medicines by 2005. 
Five years after india revised its 1970 Patents Act, patent offices 
have granted product patents on several drugs, including 
medicines for HiV/AiDS, hepatitis C and cancer. The patented 
drugs are prohibitively expensive and in the absence of generic 
competitors will remain out of reach of patients. 
On March 3, 2006, Roche proudly announced it was “becoming 
the first pharmaceutical company in india to receive a product 
patent under the new patent regime”. The patent granted is on 
peginterferon alfa-2a, a new generation hepatitis C therapy. The 
cost of this therapy is prohibitively high - above Rs 12,000 for a 
single dose vial of 180 mg. 
Patent	linkage	in	other	countries	
Efforts to link registration (marketing approval) of drugs with 
their patent status are not new and have been pushed by the 
multinational pharmaceutical industry, its associations, and the 
United States. Several developing countries have been under 
pressure to introduce patent linkages. Chile, Morocco and 
Bahrain were made to accept TRiPS-plus provisions, including 
patent linkages, in the Free Trade Agreements that they signed 
with the US. 
in 2006, Pfizer filed a case in the Philippines against the 
drug regulators (Bureau of Food and Drugs or BFAD) and a 
government-owned pharmaceutical company (PiTC, Philippine 
international Trading Corporation) to prevent them from 
registering a generic version of a patented medicine. PiTC 
had started the process of registering the generic version of 
amlodipine besylate with the BFAD by submitting samples 
imported from india so that it could obtain marketing approval 
(registration) and then promptly enter the market when Pfizer’s 
Philippines patent on amlodipine besylate expired in June 2007. 
The drug is used to treat high blood pressure and is considerably 
cheaper (5 times) in india because of generic competition. 
Subsequent to the above mentioned court case, the Philippines 
government eliminated patent linkage and intellectual 
property protection from the responsibilities of BFAD under a 
department of health administrative order, AO no 2005-0001. 
The order permits BFAD to consider and process applications 
for marketing approval of generic versions of medicines 
without the need to verify whether or not the pharmaceutical 
being submitted for registration is under patent (8). 
The European Union does not implement patent linkage. The 
EU Directorate general for Competition has noted that “patent-
linkage is considered unlawful under Regulation (EC) no 
726/2004 and Directive (EC) no 2001/83” and has documented 
the widespread use of litigation (including that against drug 
regulators) in attempts to enforce patent linkages, much like 
Bayer’s case in india (9). it is interesting that Bayer, a European 
company, is in court in india attempting to get rights that it 
does not even enjoy in Europe. 
in the US, which has a patent linkage system, the use of the 
system by patent holders to delay generic entry has been 
recorded in detail by the US Federal Trade Commission (10). 
in addition, its Food and Drug Administration has officially 
stated that its resources would be better utilised in reviewing 
applications than in reviewing patent claims, in addition to 
the fact that it does not have the expertise to review patent 
information (11).
How	companies	use	patent	linkage	to	block	generics:	
the	case	of	fluconazole	in	Africa
Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) has documented a typical 
case of how patent linkage can affect access to medicines. An 
indian generic manufacturer was refused marketing approval 
by the drug regulator in an African country for its generic 
version of fluconazole, a drug used to treat opportunistic 
infections associated with HiV. On investigation, MSF learnt 
that the grounds for this refusal was that the drug regulator 
had been informed by the originator pharmaceutical 
company that it had a patent on the drug in the country. The 
drug regulator had no legal obligation to refuse registration 
on such grounds, but it had been pressured to do so by the 
pharmaceutical company. Under further investigation, it was 
revealed that the originator pharmaceutical company’s claim 
was false and that the patent had expired more than a year 
earlier. The drug regulator eventually retracted its decision, 
and allowed the registration of the indian company’s low-cost 
generic version of the drug (12). 
World	Health	organization’s	advice	on	the	issue	
in March 2006, the World Health Organization issued a briefing 
note on “access to medicines” in which it discussed the impact 
of TRiPS-plus provisions. This note states that patent linkages 
are problematic as drug regulators are likely not to possess the 
resources or manpower to check the patent status of medicines. 
Moreover they would lack the necessary expertise to assess 
whether a patent is valid or would be infringed and would thus 
be more likely to enforce all patents including invalid ones.
The	Cancer	Patients	Aid	Association	intervenes	to	
protect	patients’	interests
By filing this case against the indian government, Bayer 
wants to set a legal precedent which will require the DCgi to 
block regulatory approval of affordable versions of patented 
medicines - even if the generic has been proved to be of 
quality, safe and effective. As discussed above, this will seriously 
undermine the use of provisions in indian law that ensure that 
even patented medicines are available and affordable in india 
and other developing countries. 
indian Journal of Medical Ethics Vol Vii no 2 April - June 2010
[ 99 ]
The Cancer Patients Aid Association had filed an intervention 
application in Bayer’s case against the government of india in 
the Delhi High Court. it intends to continue defending patients’ 
interests in the Supreme Court of india. At stake are patients’ 
lives across the developing world. 
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